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I. INTRODUCTION
People do not normally associate cities with Indian reservations.
The mental images typically conjured by each term are radically differ-
ent. For most people, "city" evokes visions of skyscrapers, streets teem-
ing with traffic, and bustling crowds. "Indian reservation," on the other
hand, brings to mind pictures of solitude, rugged nature, and large
empty spaces.
Perhaps for that reason, few think of city governments' and tribal
governments2 in similar terms.3 The two entities usually are oblivious of
one another. When they are introduced, it is often as adversaries in a
legal battle concerning the right to govern some rural western
community.4
Yet, the two forms of government have many things in common.
1. The terms "city" or "city government" are used in this Article to refer to local, general
purpose governments, including cities, towns, and villages. Cf. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept,
93 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1061-62 & n.4 (1980); Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of Ameri-
can Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 83 n.1.
It does not, however, include counties, which often have the same legal status as cities, but which
generally lack their small size and homogeneity.
2. The terms "tribe" or "tribal government" refer to any form of government adopted by a
federally recognized Indian tribe. Government structure varies somewhat from tribe to tribe. See
C. WILKINSON, AMRICAN INDIAS, TIME, AND Tm LAW 7 (1987) (stating that organic powers of
tribes are manifested in different ways, including tribal constitutions authorized by the Indian
Reorganization Act, tribal constitutions unrelated to the Act, and tribes without written constitu-
tions); Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L.
REv. 955 (1972). For purposes of this Article, the essential components of tribal government are its
relationship with the federal government and its ability to carry out the role outlined below.
3. Scholars have noted similarities between tribes and other forms of government, including
cities and counties, but have concluded that "each of these comparisons is incomplete." C. WILKiN-
SON, supra note 2, at 145 n.36. See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319-23 (1978)
(distinguishing cities, mere "agenc[ies] of the State," from Indian tribes, governing bodies with
"inherent power to prescribe laws for their members").
Although there are significant differences between the two forms of government, enough simi-
larities exist to make useful comparisons. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13)(A) (1988) (including "Indian
tribe or authorized tribal organization" within the definition of "municipality" under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148
(1982) (suggesting that differences between Indian sovereignty and local governments do not pre-
clude comparison between waiver of tribal taxing authority and waiver of city taxing authority);
Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1, 4
(1942) (stating that "tribes ... largely take the place that states and municipalities occupy to-
wards other citizens of the United States"); see also Part III, infra. Anthropologists also have
noted the similarities between the two entities. C. KLUCKHOHN & D. LEIGHTON, THE NAVAHO 162
(rev. ed. 1974) (noting that "the system of [Navajo] tribal self-government within the framework of
the state and federal governments might well be likened to that of an incredibly large (in area)
township or county in other areas").
4. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408 (1989); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1985);
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
979 (1982); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 705 F. Supp. 472 (D. Ariz. 1989).
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Both are excluded from the federal constitutional framework. Both are
subject to the plenary power of one of the constitutionally recognized
governments-cities to the state government, tribes to the federal gov-
ernment.5 Both are the most intimate form of government with which
most of their residents are familiar.
More importantly, cities and tribes both have the potential to per-
form a role that neither national nor state governments are capable of
performing. Local governments can create and give meaningful voice to
diverse value systems. This function of cities and tribes furthers two
important societal interests. First, it provides people with a much-
needed sense of community, reversing the sense of alienation prevalent
in modern liberal society. Second, it promotes the preservation and tol-
erance of disparate viewpoints, contributing to a vibrant pluralistic
society.
Judicial recognition of this unique role of local nonconstitutional
governments would alter the outcome of some legal challenges to local
government authority. It would, in a few instances, permit local govern-
ments to implement regulations that would be unconstitutional if en-
forced by the state or national government. It simultaneously would
provide a balancing point for accommodating group and individual in-
terests in a way that would facilitate the development of both commu-
nity and pluralism.
This Article draws on the experiences of both cities and tribes to
define the role that local governments could and should play in the
American federal structure. Part II examines the current theoretical
and practical status of cities and Indian tribes in the United States.
Part III outlines the similarities and Part IV the differences between
cities and Indian tribes. These sections highlight the meaningful com-
parisons between cities and tribes, and demonstrate that they share
characteristics which equip them to perform functions that neither the
federal nor state governments can carry out. Part V provides an expla-
nation of the unique normative role that cities and tribes can play in
modern society. Part VI demonstrates how courts could facilitate the
implementation of this unique role in discrete judicial controversies.
This Article concludes that cities and tribes truly are different sides of
the same coin with which modern American society can purchase both
pluralism and a strong sense of community.
5. In one famous Indian law case, the Supreme Court recognized the legal powerlessness of
tribes and cities with respect to their superior sovereigns: "There exist in the broad domain of
sovereignty [only the United States government, or the States of the Union]. There may be cities,
counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they. . . exist in subor-
dination to one or the other of these." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211
(1978) (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379 (1886)).
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II. THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL STATUS OF CITY AND TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS: THEORY AND REALITY
Scholars continue to disagree over the exact legal status of Indian
tribes and cities in our constitutional scheme of government.6 The
traditional view is that both city and tribal governments exist at the
will of a superior sovereign which could eliminate completely their right
to govern. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons cities and tribes con-
tinue to possess great autonomy in some areas. Their continued inde-
pendence despite increasingly centralized federal and state government
suggests that city and tribal governments play a critical role in modern
society. A brief review of the traditional notions of cities' and tribes'
theoretical and practical powers reveals that, while they are powerless
in an abstract legal sense, they still have considerable influence in the
lives of contemporary Americans.
A. The Status of Cities
Under the traditional view, cities are creatures of the states in
which they are located.7 They are created by the state to carry out func-
tions delegated to them by the state.8 Accordingly, the state may delin-
eate the outer boundaries of a city's authority, and expand, contract,
alter, or eliminate a city's powers.' The state may even abolish a city.10
A city must rely, therefore, on some enabling state legislation or consti-
6. Compare Frug, supra note 1, at 1062 (arguing that cities today do not have the power to
solve their problems or to control their development; their "impotence is expressed in their legal
status") with Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 112 (1990) (suggesting that "if power refers to the actual arrangements for gov-
ernance at the local level, then local governments possess considerable power"). See also R. BARSH
& J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LmsRTY viii (1980) (noting that the
"precise legal status of Indian tribes remains a source of confusion").
7. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907); Cherry v. Municipality of
Metro. Seattle, 787 P.2d 73, 74 (Wash. App. 1990); KN Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d
207, 210 (Wy. 1988).
8. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 1.01 (1989); Frug, supra note 1, at
1062-63. See also Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178 (stating that "[t]he number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territory over which they shall be exer-
cised rests in the absolute discretion of the State"). Professor Libonati succinctly summarized the
traditional view as follows: "[T]he state is the boss-the state legislature commands, localities
obey." Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 URB. LAW. 645, 645 (1987).
9. John Dillon, the author of the first published treatise on local governments, observed
that state power over municipal corporations "is supreme and transcendent: it may ... erect,
change, divide and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public good to require." J.
DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORAT7ONS § 30, at 72 (1st ed. 1872). The conventional wisdom
has not changed since that time. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 7; Libonati, supra note 8, at 649.
10. Late in the nineteenth century, a few cities were abolished by state legislatures. See H.
McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL Homs RULE 5-28 (1916), cited in Williams, The
Development of the Public/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 225, 249 n.121
(1985) (book review). Several Indian tribes similarly were abolished in the 1950s. See infra note 26.
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1991] TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN 1277
tutional provision in order to act.11
Not only must a city rely on state authorization, but according to
traditional legal principles, courts should construe that authority as
narrowly as possible. Under the traditional Dillon's Rule, courts should
interpret strictly statutes granting authority to cities. 12 Cities should
have only those powers "granted in express words . . . necessarily or
fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted. . . [or]
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.' 'I s
Given this conventional view, one might expect that cities would be
relatively unimportant in today's society. Modern cities, however, enjoy
immense and largely unchallenged powers over many matters. 4 For ex-
ample, cities make the primary decisions in critical land use matters,
such as zoning and planning. 5 In most states, cities possess broad dis-
cretion in determining the initial location of their own geographic
boundaries" and the direction of subsequent expansion. 7 Moreover,
cities possess considerable leeway in deterinining the exact contours of
11. See West Point Island Civic Ass'n v. Township Comm., 255 A.2d 237, 239 (N.J. 1969)
(noting that "[t]he powers of a New Jersey municipality are wholly derivative from state statute");
Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 743 P.2d 793, 796 (Wash. 1987) (stating that "municipal corpora-
tions possess only those powers conferred on them by the constitution, statutes, and their
charters").
12. J. DILLON, supra note 9, § 55, at 102.
13. Id. § 55, at 101-02 (emphasis in original). Some scholars question the extent to which
Dillon's Rule continues to be applied by modern courts. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 8. But see
Frug, supra note 1, at 1112. That the rule retains some force is readily apparent by its invocation
in recent cases. See, e.g., Pesticide Pub. Policy Found. v. Village of Wauconda, 510 N.E.2d 858, 861
(M. 1987); White v. Union County, 377 S.E.2d 93, 95 (N.C. App. 1989); In re Ball Mountain Dam
Hydroelec. Project, 576 A.2d 124, 126 (Vt. 1990); Resource Conservation Mgmt., Inc. v. Board of
Supervisors, 380 S.E.2d 879, 881 n.2 (Va. 1989); Chemical Bank v. Washington Pub. Power Supply
Sys., 666 P.2d 329, 334 (Wash. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1075 (1984).
14. As Professor Briffault observed, "[W]hatever the technically limited status of local units
and their formal subservience to the state, local governments have wielded substantial lawmaking
power and undertaken important public initiatives." Briffault, supra note 6, at 15. See also Wil-
liams, supra note 10, at 249 n.121 (suggesting that "[c]ommentators have sometimes failed to dis-
tinguish between cities' legal powerlessness and the issue of whether they actually are without
power").
15. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 64-72.
16. See 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 8, at §§ 1.09-.14 (1985); 1 E. McQuiLLiN, THE LAw OF MU-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 3.24-.35(g) (3d ed. 1987). See also Briffault, supra note 6, at 74 (noting
that "[tihe principal criterion for deciding whether a municipality will be incorporated is whether
the local people want it").
17. Professor Briffault has observed that there is greater variation among states concerning
local discretion to annex than local discretion to incorporate but that "as with incorporation, state
laws concerning annexation ... are quite localist." Briffault, supra note 6, at 77-78. See also Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 71.012.2.(2) (Vernon 1991) (providing that a city may annex if "annexation is reasona-
ble and necessary to the proper development of the city"); City of O'Fallon v. Betham, 569 S.W. 2d
295, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that "authority granted to cities to extend their corporate
limits constitutes a broad grant of discretionary power").
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substantive criminal law for nonfelonious acts."'
These powers, of course, are subject to the overriding supervision
of the state legislature. Theoretically, states could radically alter a city's
authority at any time. 9 That cities maintain significant authority, how-
ever, demonstrates the popular appeal of preserving local control over
local matters.
B. The Status of Indian Tribes
Unlike cities, which traditionally are viewed as creations of the su-
perior state sovereign, Indian tribes traditionally are perceived as dis-
crete political units with inherent powers.20 Tribal legislation does not
require the superior sovereign's authorization in order to be legiti-
mate.21 Indian tribes have inherent authority to govern within their ge-
ographic boundaries.22
Under the traditional view, however, tribal sovereignty is of a
"unique and limited character" 23 because it is subject to complete fed-
eral supremacy.24 Federal supremacy over tribal sovereignty manifests
18. See Dunn v. Mayor of Wilmington, 219 A.2d 153, 154 (Del. 1966); Albert Simon, Inc. v.
Myerson, 367 N.Y.S.2d 755, 758 (N.Y. 1975); Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah
1968).
19. Indeed, most scholars agree that states tend to limit local authority in many of these
areas. Scholars likely have overstated, however, the exact degree and impact of this tendency. See
Briffault, supra note 6, at 15-18.
20. F. COHEN, HANIDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945) (suggesting that "[p]erhaps the
most basic principle of all Indian law . . . is the principle that those powers which are lawfully
vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Con-
gress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished"),
cited with approval in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978).
21. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 (1982); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956).
22. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 149.
23. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
24. The current conventional view, as bluntly stated by one federal judge, is that "an Indian
tribe is sovereign to the extent that the United States permits it to be sovereign-neither more nor
less." United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 364 F. Supp. 192, 194 (D. Mont. 1973). At times, courts
and scholars have linked federal supremacy over Indian tribes to various constitutional grants of
congressional authority. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7
(1973) (stating that "the power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce with
Indian tribes and for treaty making"); Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195, 199 (1984) (noting that "[tihe Plenary Power Doctrine
...can be traced not only to [the constitutional] commerce power but also to the treaty, war, and
other foreign affairs powers, as well as the property power"). At other times, courts have tied this
federal supremacy to notions of conquest and consent. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (positing that as a result of European discovery of America, tribal "rights
to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished"); Duro v. Reina, 110
S. Ct. 2053, 2066 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "[w]hen the tribes were incorpo-
rated into the territory of the United States and accepted the protection of the Federal Govern-
ment, they necessarily lost some of the sovereign powers they had previously exercised"). At one
time, the Supreme Court employed a trust theory to justify federal regulation. See United States
1278
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itself primarily in two ways. First, the federal government can alter a
tribal government's powers through plenary congressional authority.
25
Congress has exercised that authority in the most extreme form, com-
plete elimination of tribal sovereignty. 8 Second, federal common law
prevents tribes from exercising governmental authority inconsistent
with their status as domestic dependent nations. Like cities, therefore,
Indian tribes are subject to the plenary power of the superior sovereign,
protected only by the political processes through which the legislative
body of the superior sovereign is chosen and subsequently acts.
Also like cities, Indian tribes nonetheless continue to possess a
great deal of autonomy over various matters. With limited exceptions,
tribes have the authority to define conditions of tribal membership, 8
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). That idea largely has been abandoned. Clinton, Isolated in Their
Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33
STAN. L. REv. 979, 1002 (1981).
25. Congress can "limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the
tribes otherwise possess." Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). See also Escon-
dido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 787 n.30 (1984) (asserting
that "all aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress").
26. During the "Termination Era" of the 1950s, 109 tribes and bands were terminated. Wil-
kinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. IND. L. REV. 139, 151 (1977).
Termination of a tribe involves termination of the federal trusteeship over the tribe, distribution
of tribal assets to tribal members, and in some cases, disbandment of the tribe. Clinton, supra note
24, at 1025.
The large number of tribes terminated may be misleading unless placed in context. One stat-
ute, for example, terminated 61 bands in western Oregon. The total membership of all the termi-
nated Oregon bands, however, was 2081, and only 2158 acres were involved. Wilkinson & Biggs,
supra, at 151. In all "no more than [three] per cent of all federally recognized Indians were in-
volved" in the entire termination process. Id. Tribal status eventually was restored to some of the
terminated tribes. See, e.g., The Menominee Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1988). Simi-
larly, late in the nineteenth century, state legislation abolished some cities. See supra note 10.
27. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). The two common-law limits that
courts originally placed on tribes as domestic dependent nations were the inability to freely alien-
ate tribal land, Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574, and a prohibition against entering into direct
diplomatic or commercial relations with foreign nations. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). More recently, the Supreme Court has held that tribes lack the authority to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over both non-Native Americans, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), and Native Americans who are not members of the tribe. Duro, 110 S.
Ct. at 2053. Federal common law also limits, to some less specified degree, tribal civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (sug-
gesting that tribal court determinations regarding their jurisdiction over nonmembers may be sub-
ject to review by a federal court); Montana, 450 U.S. at 559 (finding that a tribe has no authority
to prohibit hunting and fishing on fee lands owned by non-Native Americans). Federal common
law also precludes tribes from preempting state regulation of liquor sales on the reservation. Rice
v. Relmer, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983).
28. Tribes have the right to determine the condition of tribal membership for purposes of
determining entitlement to most tribally granted privileges. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657
(1897); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846). Tribes, however, may not alter
the federal definition of "Indian," which determines entitlement to federal benefits or exemptions.
See United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80 (1972); Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73.
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regulate the domestic relations of members s2 control land use matters
within the reservations, 0 direct the conduct of members through crimi-
nal sanctions,3' and exclude nonmembers from tribal lands.32 The con-
tinued existence of these powers is due less to the formal political
power of tribes 3 and more to the perception that retention of such
powers is essential to the preservation of tribal cultural values and
customs.
Both tribes and cities, therefore, exercise substantial autonomy, de-
spite their theoretical powerlessness. The superior sovereign's willing-
ness to allow these governments significant authority indicates that
those who control the superior sovereign, the people, value the roles
fulfilled by local governments. An examination of the similarities and
differences between cities and tribes explains much of that popular ap-
peal and lays the groundwork for an evaluation of the role local govern-
ments can play in modern society.
29. Jurisdiction over the divorce of two members who reside on the reservation is vested
exclusively in the tribe. Whyte v. District Court, 346 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
829 (1960). When both parties are domiciled outside the reservation, however, the state has juris-
diction. United States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
999 (1975).
Tribal authority over the adoption of tribal members residing on the reservation is, with mi-
nor exceptions, exclusive. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903 (1988); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382
(1976). Tribes also retain limited authority over adoptions involving tribal members who do not
reside on the reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1988).
30. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989). Tribal zoning authority over lands within reservations is not complete. Although a tribe has
the right to control the use of land owned by the tribe or a member, fee land owned by nonmem-
bers may be immune from tribal land use control under certain circumstances. Id. See infra sub-
part VI(B).
31. Tribes have inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). Jurisdiction over minor offenses committed by
tribal members is exclusive of either federal or state jurisdiction. United States v. Jackson, 600
F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n.2 (1977)).
Federal legislation vests federal courts with jurisdiction to try Native Americans charged with
specified major crimes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1988). Whether that jurisdiction is exclusive of
tribal jurisdiction is not clear. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 2057 n.1 (1990). Tribes may not
exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers regardless of whether they are Native Americans,
id. at 2061, or non-Native Americans, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
But see Pub. L. No. 101-938, § 8077(b)(d) (1990) (suspending the effect of Duro until September
30, 1991). Nor may tribes sentence members to more than one year imprisonment and $5000 in
fines. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988). Tribes may, however, exclude nonconforming members and non-
members from reservations. See infra note 32.
32. Duro, 110 S. Ct. at 2061-62; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 433 (opinion of Stevens, J.); New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983). Underscoring the superior power of
the federal government, the Ninth Circuit has held that the tribe may not exercise its power to
exclude those who are authorized by federal law to be on the reservation. United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986).
33. The tribes have no representatives in Congress.
1280
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III. THE SAME COIN: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN INDIAN TRIBES AND CITIES
The most striking similarity between city and tribal governments is
that neither is included in the governmental scheme set forth in the
federal constitution,34 even though both had long been established as
forms of government on the American continent by the time the Consti-
tution was adopted. 5 The exact reason for their exclusion is unclear.3 6
The omission is significant, however, because it suggests that cities and
tribes are not "governments" in the same sense as are the federal and
state governments. The historical development of city and tribal gov-
ernments supports this conclusion.
A. Constitutional Nonrecognition: Voluntary Governments
Only some, years after the adoption of the Constitution did people
begin to associate cities and tribes with the kinds of activities per-
formed by constitutionally recognized forms of government. The prede-
cessors of American cities originally were not conceived of as artificial
entities or subdivisions of the state created to provide governmental
services.3 7 Most precolonial English cities were close corporations
34. No form of city government is mentioned in the constitutional text. The term "Indian
tribes" appears once-in the clause giving Congress authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.
3. This provision, however, sheds little light on the status of tribal government in the constitu-
tional scheme, a fact borne out by the difficulty courts have had in defining that role and by their
frequent failure to refer to the Constitution in that effort.
35. Tribal governments clearly predated the two constitutionally recognized forms of govern-
ment, federal and state. City governments, as either formal corporations, or more commonly, as
associations of neighbors, also established their presence in American society long before the
Revolution. See Frug, supra note 1, at 1095-97. See generally 1 E. GRIFFrrH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CITY GOVERNmEm. THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1938); McBain, The Legal Status of the American Colo-
nial City, 40 POL. ScL Q. 177 (1925).
36. Indian tribes probably were omitted because the Framers thought of them as quasi-for-
eign nations to be dealt with by war and treaties. See Newton, supra note 24, at 200. The Framers
may have considered cities to be mere subdivisions of the states and, therefore, indirectly included
by way of reference to the states. Given the contemporary view of the legal status of cities at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, however, some other factor is more likely, such as the
view that cities were not merely another layer of government, but rather a voluntary "association
promoted by a powerful sense of community." Frug, supra note 1, at 1119; see also id. at 1098. But
cf. Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Divergence Between Text and Practice in
Our Early State Constitutions, 62 VA. L. REV. 999, 1001-02 (1976). Herget asserts that local gov-
ernments may have been omitted from state constitutions because they were corporations, "an
association of persons with a legal existence, a 'personality,' independent of its members," and,
therefore, were assumed to be created by, and subject to, state authority. Id. at 1004-05.
37. In the words of historian Ernest Griffith, "[p]rimarily judicial, monopolistic, corpora-
tive-not administrative or governmental-were these communities at their inception. Not until
well towards the Revolution does one see the dawn of a new motivation which to-day would be
called truly urban." 1 E. GRiFFrrH, supra note 35, at 74.
Many modern theorists have adopted the view that local governments are primarily service
providers. See, e.g., Connery, Governing the City, in GOVERNING THE CrrY 6 (R. Connery & D.
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originating from the hundreds of boroughs in the British Isles.38 English
towns often originated as voluntary associations of people seeking pro-
tection from outside economic and military forces.3 9 Even in American
colonial times, cities usually were thought of as associations or corpora-
tions, organizations created to effectuate the common desires of their
individual members. Not until the nineteenth century did people con-
sistently begin to view cities as public bodies more state-like than pri-
vate-like.40 Thus, the social and legal atmosphere of cities at the time
was manifestly more associational than governmental.4'
Caraley eds., 1969); Kaufman, Bureaucrats and Organized Civil Servants, in id. at 45, 53. Others
have focused on the city's role in community self-determination. See R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961). The effect of these distinct concepts of local
governments on Supreme Court decisions is discussed in Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New
Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political
Dramas of the 1980's, 21 B.C. L. REV. 763 (1980).
38. 1 E. GRIFFITH, supra note 35, at 15-21. There was, of course, no single corporate form; it
varied depending on "the date of incorporation, the size of the fees paid, the whims of the lord or
the sovereign, and other more or less irrelevant considerations." Id. at 22. Although the trend
favored "the 'close' corporation with its self-perpetuating governing body," the more democratic
type "remained sufficiently numerous so that it was by no means exceptional." Id. at 27.
New England townships developed in their own unique manner. Id. at 76. Their failure to take
on the more traditional corporate form was due in part to broad legislative grants providing them
with many of the privileges of incorporation. Id. at 71.
39. Frug, supra note 1, at 1083-87. One of the major purposes of municipal incorporation was
to manage the corporate property, which often consisted chiefly of the "common land." 1 E. GRiu-
FITH, supra note 35, at 23. General services to the public, police security and land surveying, often
were provided by paid officials who were not under the jurisdiction of the corporation. Id. at 19. In
America, one of the primary motivations for municipal incorporation was the desire of the inhabi-
tants "to establish a monopoly in their craft or trade over against [sic] 'foreigners' or pedlars." Id.
at 65. Incorporation was chosen because it made it legal "to restrict such activities to 'freemen,'
and also to control the standards and practices thereof." Id.
Sometimes the common desires sought to be effectuated were less materialistic. William Penn
advocated townships because "in that way the children can be kept at school and much more
conveniently brought up well. Neighbors also can better offer each other loving and helpful hands
and with united mouth can in public assemblies praise and extol the greatness of God." Id. at 58-
59 (quoting Pastorius, Pastorius's Description of Pennsylvania, 1700 (G. Kimball trans.), in NAR-
RATIVES OF EARLY PENNSYLVANIA, WEST NEW JERSEY, AND DELAWARE (A. Myers ed., 1912)). More
meaningful representation in the legislative body was another reason for incorporation. Id. at 69.
40. Frug, supra note 1, at 1099-1109; 1 E. GRIFFITH, supra note 35, at 51. But cf. id. at 69
(considerations "such as an interest in law and order or in better government generally, or in the
provision of municipal services" did begin to appear in the eighteenth century).
41. Ernest Griffith ably summarized the atmosphere as follows:
[I]n this intimate stage the government was that of a unit sufficiently small so that the per-
sons involved were known to each other, and something really approaching common agree-
ment was possible. Social pressure as well as (or instead of) legal pressure could ordinarily be
counted upon to assure the necessary degree of co-operation in community projects. These
people went to church together; they deliberated both in and out of town meetings the hiring
of a teacher for their children; they arrived at working agreements concerning the use to be
made of their common land. In this situation the obligations of members of the community to
do their stint of service in road building and repair; to take their turn in the watch against
fire, or against the French or the Indians; to provide a fire bucket or two; to hang a lantern at
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Similarly, Indian tribal organizations42 were not originally created
with carefully defined functions and limitations.43 They generally began
as communities of people who grouped together because of common an-
cestry or beliefs. Several tribes were simply "associations of wandering
hunter-gathering families. ' '44 Even the more elaborately organized tribal
governments generally were composed of self-governing towns and
bands or clans, which combined in confederations for limited pur-
poses." That there was little concept of government as a separate entity
in early tribal organizations is underscored by the fact that most tribal
names can be interpreted simply to mean "the people. '46
The same sense of unity between the tribe and its members carried
over into the decisionmaking process. While some tribes' decisions were
night by their door-all could command that measure of common co-operation which made
these methods not too great a strain on human nature to be practicable and economical.
See 1 E. GRIFFITH, supra note 35, at 259.
42. One must proceed with considerable caution in discussing the nature of pre-twentieth-
century tribal governments because of the immense diversity in the forms of tribal organizations
that existed prior to the 1930s when many tribal governments were created in the image of the
Anglo-Saxon model under the Indian Reorganization Act. There continue to be diverse forms of
tribal governments today, hence generalities are not entirely accurate now; but there is enough
commonality to make worthwhile comparisons.
43. Only a few tribes had formal governments or written laws prior to contact with non-
Native Americans. D. GE'rcHEs & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 270
(2d ed. 1986). This does not mean, however, that there were no rules or social norms. It means only
that they were not enforced by modern legal means. W. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA 40
(1975) (stating that "the complex and smooth-working social organization of the tribes ... func-
tioned without the need for written laws or the paraphernalia of European civilization").
44. A. GIBSON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 54 (1980). Anthropologists
call these associations "tribelets." Id.
45. Id. at 56-57. "Indian tribes in their original setting never attempted to govern a large
number of people. Subgroupings in bands and clans was almost always a feature of the larger
tribes... " V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREmGNTY 247 (1984). The tendency toward small, homogeneous governmental units re-
flected a desire for community-based government in which leaders were sensitive to community
values, "Indians realized that it was not good government to have leaders and representatives who
did not have some kind of personal acquaintance with the people they led. If leaders were remote,
people felt alienated, and it was much more difficult for a community to function." Id.
46. V. DELORiA & C. LYTLE, supra note 45, at 8. For example, the Navajo word for tribe is
"dine," meaning "the people." C. KLUCKHOHN & D. LEIGHTON, supra note 3, at 23. There are, of
course, exceptions:
The people who pierced their noses have now become the Nez Perce; the prosperous people
have become the Gros Ventres; the allies, or friends, have become the Sioux; and some tribes
have called themselves after the holy location where they finally came to rest-they are now
the people who live at the lake, on the river, and so forth.
V. DELORIA & C. LrrLE, supra note 45, at 8-9. See also Bagley & Ruckman, Iroquois Contributions
to Modern Democracy and Communism, 7:2 AM. INDIAN CULTURE RES. J. 53, 55 (1983) (providing
other names: Cayuga, "People at the Landing"; Seneca, "Great Hill People"; Mohawk, "People of
the Flint").
The exceptions only serve to make the general rule more meaningful, as they are often names
derived from a non-Indian language (likely imposed by outsiders, e.g., Nez Perce and Gros Ven-
tres), or they incorporate the concept of "people" in the title by adding it to a geographic location.
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made by chiefs or religious leaders, most tribes determined policy
through consensus in general council meetings open to all tribal mem-
bers.47 Not until the 1930s, when many tribal governments were re-
structured according to Western models under the Indian
Reorganization Act,48 did tribal governments take the form of bureau-
cratic entities separate from the people. 49 Like cities, therefore, tribes
only recently have assumed the visage of another layer of government,
competing with their federal counterpart for the allegiance of their
citizens.50
Constitutional omission and historical development both suggest,
therefore, that cities and tribes are not merely another layer of govern-
ment, different from their federal and state counterparts only in the
scope of their geographical authority. They originally were created as
voluntary associations of people with common interests. The absence of
cities and tribes from the constitutional structure allows them to em-
phasize their voluntary nature.
The Constitution apparently assumes that, with limited excep-
tion,51 everyone within the geographic boundaries of the United States
will be subject to both the federal government and a state govern-
ment.5 2 Everyone5 3 who chooses to live in the United States," therefore,
is a member of both a state and national "community."55 One may,
47. D. GETcHEs-& C. WILINSON, supra note 43, at 270. Among the Navajos, for example,
"[h]eadmen have no powers of coercion .... Decisions as to 'community' policy can be reached
only by the consensus of a local meeting. The People themselves are the real authority." C. KLUCK-
HOHN & D. LEIGHTON, supra note 3, at 118.
48. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1988)).
49. This recent transformation was not easily accepted by all tribes. As two leading anthro-
pologists observed years after the Navajo Tribe was formally reorganized according to Western
legal concepts:
The present practice of actually voting for candidates or on policy decisions is a white
innovation and still makes most older and middle-aged Navajos uncomfortable, since the
Navajo pattern was for discussion to be continued until unanimity was reached, or at least
until those in opposition felt it was useless or impolitic to express further disagreement.
C. KLUCKHOHN & D. LEIGHTON, supra note 3, at 120.
50. For example, "it has not been established that there was a 'Navaho Tribe' in the sense of
an organized, centralized 'political' entity" prior to the twentieth century. C. KLuCKHOHN & D.
LEIGHTON, supra note 3, at 122.
51. Those residing in territories of the United States and the District of Columbia are not
residents of any state.
52. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852) (noting that "[e]very citizen of the
United States is also a citizen of a State or territory").
53. Again, there is one exception. See supra note 51.
54. Foreign nationals residing in the United States are neither citizens of the United States
nor of any state. They are, however, subject to regulation by the state and federal government.
55. The nation and the state are not communities in the same sense as are tribes and cities.
Although some self-identification and value creation is facilitated by these entities, they are so
large and abstract that their actual effect on an individual is much weaker than that of more
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however, reside in the United States and not be a member of either a
city or tribal community. One may accept all the benefits of residence
within the United States without agreeing to be subject to any local
nonconstitutional government. The choice to join such a local commu-
nity is voluntary as far as the Constitution is concerned.
The comparatively voluntary nature of membership in local com-
munities"8 allows local governments greater leeway in choosing norms
for their members.5 7 Because withdrawal from the local community is
easier than from the state or national community, it is less distasteful
for a local government to subject its members to community decisions.
People who disagree with the choices of a particular community can
seek a community more compatible with their values or they can choose
to live in no community at all." As a result of their voluntary character,
personalized communities like tribes, cities, or purely private associations. See Sandel, The Proce-
dural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 93 (1984) (stating that "[e]xcept
for extraordinary moments, such as war, the nation proved too vast a scale across which to culti-
vate the shared self-understandings necessary to community in the formative, or constitutive
sense"). The term "citizen" rather than "member of the community" may more appropriately de-
scribe the relationship between the resident and the state and national governments.
56. The choice to join a city or tribe is not entirely voluntary. Annexation may occur against
the objection of an individual, for example. Moreover, there are real economic and social costs
involved in any relocation. See infra note 58. Switching local communities, however, involves fewer
costs than switching national or state communities. If one wants to change city membership, one
simply needs to move to a new city. Changes in tribal affiliation are more difficult because they
involve renunciation of tribal membership or moving off the reservation; but such a course of ac-
tion is usually less difficult than relocation to a new state or country.
57. If one accepts the social contract theory that obligations can derive only from willful
undertakings, then "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that groups in which willfulness is height-
ened and maximized can rightfully impose greater obligations upon their members than can those
catholic religious and political associations where membership is, for all practical purposes, inher-
ited." M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND CITIZENSHIP 10 (1970). But see
Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1045-46 (1983)
(suggesting that "[t]he more voluntary groups-clubs, leagues, and so on-probably appear to
most people to be less morally qualified to impose obligations than are the more ascriptive
groups").
58. In 1956 Charles Tiebout theorized that residential communities in metropolitan areas
could act in a market-like manner to compete for residents, and that households would choose
among competing environments by voting with their feet. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Ex-
penditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956). Empirical studies have justified the theory to some extent.
See, e.g., Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values:
An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957
(1969); Yinger, Capitalization and the Theory of Local Public Finances, 90 J. POL. ECON. 917
(1982). This does not mean that a move from one city to another is entirely without costs. Con-
trary to the assumptions underlying the Tiebout theory, "the out-of-pocket and aggravation costs
of moving are not trivial." Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519,
1552 (1982). These costs, however, are almost always less than those involved in a change in either
state or national citizenship. See G. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LocAL AUTONOMY
27 (1985) (noting that "[e]xit is clearly less practical and, with exceptions, less realistic at [the
national] level").
The emotional costs of changing community membership increase to the degree one's values
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local governments, therefore, may properly impose norms on their
members that would be inappropriate at a state or federal level.
There are, of course, limits on the choices that local governments
justifiably can place on their citizens. The extent to which modern
American organizations are morally justified in imposing norms on their
members can be plotted on a continuum. More voluntary organizations,
such as purely social clubs, are at one extreme of the continuum, and
the federal government is at the other. States are close to the federal
government extreme of the continuum, but do not reach it because one
can more easily switch states than countries. Local governments, while
closer to states than to social clubs, nonetheless fall more to the volun-
tary side of the continuum than do state governments.6 9 Thus, some
group value decisions are more appropriate for local governments than
for either the federal or state governments. The lack of constitutional
status for local governments highlights, and permits, the implementa-
tion of this distinction.
B. Lack of Constitutional Protection: Consensus, Acceptance, and
Values
A second similarity between tribal and city governments is a direct
corollary of their absence from the constitutional framework: both city
and tribal governments lack express federal constitutional protection
for their continued status. The only protection cities and tribes have
against alteration and even elimination by the superior sovereign is
through use of the political process by which the superior sovereign
governs. Moreover, no structural advantages are given to either tribes
or cities in the political arena. Unlike states, which have direct influ-
ence in the Senate6" and indirect influence over both the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Executive,6 1 neither cities nor Indian tribes have
are reflected in the community, as evidenced by the difficulty some have in leaving small homoge-
neous communities. People who feel compatible with their community, however, are less likely to
leave.
59. Cf. M. WALzER, supra note 57, at 10 (noting that "it is possible to conclude from contract
theory, as Jean Jacques Rousseau did, that small societies are (generally) morally superior to large
ones"); Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1349, 1355 (1982) (identifying "[l]ocal government with home rule" as more "[p]rivate" than pub-
licly elected "[legislators, judges, [e]xecutives").
60. States have "direct" influence in the Senate because of the equal representation require-
ment. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
61. States have "indirect" influence in the House through the control of electoral qualifica-
tions and division of districts. States have "indirect" influence over the Executive through the
electoral college. Each state is free to choose its electors "in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Supreme Court explained the significance of
these structural political protections in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
556 (1985).
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formal representation in or special influence over state or federal
governments.6 2
Cities and tribes, therefore, constantly must legitimize their exis-
tence. Their survival depends almost completely on the ability to mus-
ter support on critical issues from their residents and convince
outsiders of the merits of their causes.6" The fact that tribes and cities
have remained vibrant and autonomous in many respects64 is a testi-
mony to their ability to build internal consensus and acquire external
acceptance.
An analysis of the areas over which local governments have greatest
autonomy demonstrates that cities and tribes have been most successful
in building internal consensus and acquiring external acceptance with
respect to matters involving normative choices. Cities and tribes, for
example, have some authority to determine what kinds of conduct
merit criminal punishment-one of society's more powerful tools for en-
forcing group morality.65 Zoning control, through which local govern-
ments have wide discretion to determine what kinds of activities occur
in an area, is also a potentially potent influence over members of a com-
munity6 6 and a tool by which local governments may encourage like-
minded people to move into a community.6 7 Both cities and tribes also
have some control over the types of pornographic materials that may be
purchased within their boundaries, 8 a matter almost entirely depen-
62. Indian tribes have no representation in the federal government and, apart from the votes
of tribal members, no direct influence on the election of federal officials. Cf. R. BARSH & J. HEN-
DERSON, supra note 6, at 281 (suggesting a constitutional amendment to allow tribal representation
in Congress).
Cities and other local governments once had greater representation in state legislatures
through direct representation of geographic areas. Since Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
however, direct representation of cities has been eliminated.
63. Scholars have recognized the need for both tribal and city governments to acquire exter-
nal acceptance. See, e.g., C. WILKINSON, supra note 2, at 86 (suggesting that "Indian leaders know
full well that whether tribal sovereignty will decline or progress will depend in important part on
the tribes' skill in presenting their views in the legislative forum"); G. CLARK, supra note 58, at 6
(positing that "[l]ocal governments. . . have a specific role to play in representing their constitu-
ents before other agencies and citizens. . . . [L]ocal government legitimacy rests, in part, on the
extent to which it fulfills this representative role").
64. See supra notes 15-19, 28-33 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 18, 31 and accompanying text.
66. See Worthen, Sword or Shield: The Past and Future Impact of Western Legal Thought
on American Indian Sovereignty, 104 HARv. L. RPv. 1372, 1389 (1991) (book review).
67. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 39, 57.
68. Whether tribes have the same authority as cities to draw the line between unprotected
obscenity and protected expression is unclear. It is likely that they do have that authority for at
least two reasons. First, the First Amendment does not on its own terms apply to tribes. The only
limitation on the tribes' authority to regulate expression is contained in the Indian Civil Rights
Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1988) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall. . . make or enforce any law. . . abridging the freedom of speech. . ."). Although the word-
ing of the ICRA is nearly identical to the First Amendment's free speech language, courts have
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dent on values. As a further example, the local public education system
provides a means of establishing a common moral foundation on which
community members can build. 9 Local governments, therefore, have
been quite successful in using their well-honed consensus and accept-
ance-building skills to protect their power to implement unique norma-
tive choices.
C. Territory and Association: Public Intermediary Institutions
The first two similarities between cities and tribes-the lack of
both constitutional recognition and protection-distinguishes them
from federal and state governments. The third similarity-that cities
and tribes are territorially based institutions-differentiates them from
private associations. Both cities and tribes require a land base over
which to exercise control,70 and their authority generally is limited to
that specific geographic area.71
Decisions of city and tribal governments affect the day-to-day lives
of those within the geographic ambit of their power. Consequently,
those who reside within a local government's boundaries have a signifi-
properly concluded that it need not be interpreted in the exact manner as the Constitution. See
infra text accompanying notes 146-48. Given the deference normally shown to tribes with respect
to internal tribal matters, it is unlikely that courts would interpret free speech more stringently for
tribes than for cities.
Second, the Supreme Court used broad language in outlining the role of local communities in
defining obscenity. The Court referred simply to "contemporary community standards." See Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973). There is no reason why an Indian tribe would not constitute
an appropriate "community," much as cities have, especially since tribal members often share
common moral values.
69. Worthen, supra note 66, at 1389 n.82.
70. See 0. REYNOLDS, HANDBooK op LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 66 (1982) ("[T]erritory over
which the government has some control" is essential to the existence of effective local govern-
ment.); Clinton, supra note 24, at 1042 ("[Flor Indian tribes ownership of a land base and the
exercise of government power are integrally intertwined."). See also Worthen, supra note 66, at
1387-89. The "linkage of lordship and landlordship" (the link between land ownership and the
right to govern) traces back to feudal origins. Williams, supra note 10, at 228.
71. Tribal governmental authority is limited to "Indian country" under current federal law.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1152 (1988) (criminal jurisdiction); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975) (civil jurisdiction). Indian country includes some limited areas outside the
reservation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b)-(c) (Indian country includes nonreservation lands which are
"dependent Indian communities" or "Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished"). Even then, however, Indian country is defined in terms of geographic location.
Clinton, supra note 24, at 1043 & n.324.
Indian tribes not recognized by the federal government have no land base. For example, the
Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina, which is the second largest tribe in America by population, is not
a federally recognized tribe. D. GETcHEs & C. WuImnSON, supra note 43, at 5. More than 100,000
Native Americans east of the Mississippi are not part of a federally recognized tribe. Id.
Nonfederally recognized tribes are not included in the scope of this Article, not because they
are unimportant, but rather because the Article focuses on tribal governments (not individual Na-
tive Americans) and on the relationship between those governments and the federal government.
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cant incentive to participate in that government's decisionmaking pro-
cess. That incentive is weaker with respect to the state or federal
government,72 and may not exist at all in private associations.73 More-
over, residents living in a relatively small geographic area have more of
an opportunity to engage in debate.74 It is, after all, easier to travel to
city hall to discuss a matter than to board a plane for Washington,
D.C.7 5 Thus, local governments present their members with both moti-
vation and opportunity to participate meaningfully in group decision-
making. This, in some respects, facilitates the creation and defense of
local value systems.
Additionally, the existence of a territorial base, and some control
over land development within that area, have subtle, psychological im-
pacts on a local government's ability to create and maintain value sys-
tems. The opening of Indian reservations to non-Indians under the
Allotment Act 78 in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which
resulted in the loss of almost sixty-five percent of the tribal land base
nationwide,77 profoundly affected tribes' abilities to build true commu-
nities. As one historian described:
No longer did many tribal Indians feel pride in the tribal possession of hundreds of
72. As De Tocqueville observed:
It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the state,
because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the state can have upon
his own lot. But if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a
glance that there is a connection between this small public affair and his greatest private
affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie which unites private
to general interest.
2 A. DE TOCQUEviLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 125 (H. Reeve trans., 1961).
73. The incentive to participate might not exist when the actions of the private association
do not affect the daily lives of its members.
74. Frug, supra note 1, at 1145 (stating that "[a] territorial association ... can readily in-
clude every individual in the geographic area, thereby presenting the greatest opportunity for
widespread participation in its decisions"). See also 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 72, at 125
(noting that "if the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside
there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted,
and to adapt themselves to one another").
75. On a very limited number of reservations, such as the Navajo, the distance between home
and the seat of local authority may be significant. See P. STUART, NATIONS WITHIN A NATION 33
(table 2.19) (1987) (showing that the Navajo Reservation covers more than 15 million acres). The
vast majority of reservations, however, are much smaller. Id. at 32-33. And even residents of those
few reservations which cover larger areas usually will find it easier to attend meetings at the tribal
headquarters than in Washington, D.C.
76. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C.). The original plan was to allot parcels of land to individual tribal members-160 acres to
each head of household and 40 acres to each minor. Surplus lands were then to be made available
to non-Native Americans. C. WMKINSON, supra note 2, at 19-20. The Act is also known as the
Dawes Act, after its sponsor. Id. at 19.
77. Total tribal landholdings fell from over 138 million acres in 1887 to approximately 52
million acres in 1934. Id. at 20.
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square miles of territory which they could use as a member of the tribe. Now they
were forced to limit their life and their vision to an incomprehensible individual
plot of 160 or so acres in a checkerboard of neighbors, hostile and friendly, rich and
poor, white and red.
The blow was less economic than psychological and even spiritual. A way of
life had been smashed; a value system destroyed .. . The admired order and the
sense of community often observed in early Indian communities were replaced by
the easily caricatured features of rootless, shiftless, drunken outcasts, so familiar to
the reader of early twentieth-century newspapers.
7 8
Possession and control of a land base thus can provide cities and tribes
with a tool for building and maintaining value systems that is generally
unavailable to private, voluntary associations and much more unwieldy
for national or state governments to use. 9
In sum, the major similarities between cities and tribes highlight
the fact that they are neither merely another layer of formal govern-
ment, nor simply voluntary associations or private corporations. Local
nonconstitutional governments are hybrids, imbued with the character-
istics of both private and public organizations."0 They can, therefore,
play a different role than either constitutional governments or private
associations. They are, in a sense, public intermediary institutions l or,
78. W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW: A STUDY OF THE PAST AND PRESENT
STATUS OF THE AMERIcAN INDiN 75-76 (1971). See generally Worthen, supra note 66, at 1388-89.
79. The geographic component of cities and tribes differentiates them from private associa-
tions in another critical respect-the ease with which one can voluntarily withdraw from the asso-
ciation. Although it is easier to resign from a city or tribe than from a state or nation, see supra
note 56 and accompanying text, one still must bear the economic, psychological, and other costs
associated with changing residence. See supra note 58. This makes it more difficult to withdraw
from a local government than from a private, voluntary association. This, in turn, limits the degree
to which local governments may enforce moral norms.
80. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized this unique dual personality with respect to
Indian tribes. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (tribes are not mere "private
voluntary organizations," but are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory" (emphasis added)).
The same concept has long been recognized in municipal corporation law. See Herget, supra
note 36, at 1007-08 (discussing early nineteenth-century notion of nonconstitutional authority of
local governments to carry out essentially private functions). Its most prevalent form is the govern-
mental/proprietary distinction that has plagued the law of municipal corporations for so long.
That courts have difficulty drawing the line between the two functions, see, e.g., Matter of County
of Monroe, 530 N.E.2d 202, 203 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting the distinction as unworkable), suggests that
cities still may not be wholly governmental or proprietary.
Historians also have recognized that cities are markedly different from the traditional state
and national governments. See, e.g., 1 E. GRIFrrH, supra note 35, at 11 (stating that a city "is and
always has been a group in the sociological sense").
81. Other courts and scholars have noted the role of private intermediary organizations (or
mediating institutions) as a buffer between the state and the individual. See, e.g., Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984) (private associations serve as "critical buffers be-
tween the individual and the power of the State"); Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurispru-
dence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99, 115; Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1713, 1715 (1988). As public intermediary organizations, local nonconstitutional govern-
ments serve a similar, though not identical role.
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to view it another way, voluntary governments. Either characterization
suggests that city and tribal governments have a unique role in modern
society, unfulfilled by the more nonvoluntary forms of government.
IV. DIFFERENT SIDES: DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CITY AND TRIBAL
GOVERNMENTS
The previous section revealed meaningful similarities between cit-
ies and tribes relating to their ability to build true communities, estab-
lishing common values, for their respective members. This section
indicates that the differences between the two entities are less profound
than they first appear, and less significant than the differences found
between them and their constitutional "superiors."
A. Traditional Sources of Power
One obvious difference between city and tribal governments is their
sources of power. As noted above, the traditional view is that cities have
no inherent authority, but derive all their power from some specific leg-
islative or constitutional grant.82 Tribes, on the other hand, as sovereign
powers have inherent authority to govern; they need not point to any
enabling legislation to justify their actions.83 Further inspection, how-
ever, diminishes this perceived gap between the two entities.
Although cities must point to some enabling statute or constitu-
tional grant to support each action, the existence of "home rule" provi-
sions, or other broad grants of authority to cities, renders this
requirement almost illusory in most states. 4 While the full-fledged local
sovereignty envisioned by some early proponents of home rule8 5 has
82. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
84. Grants of home-rule authority generally have been broadly worded and liberally con-
strued. As Dean Sandalow noted in his seminal article on home-rule powers:
Analysis of the decisions reveals that, with the possible exception of a single state, the grant
of municipal initiative in home rule provisions has been broadly construed by the courts.
There are, of course, in almost every jurisdiction a few decisions limiting the scope of munici-
pal initiative, but ... in most jurisdictions [they] have not resulted in denying municipalities
power to legislate concerning those matters which even the staunchest advocates of local au-
tonomy consider appropriate for local control.
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L.
REv. 643, 663 (1964) (footnotes omitted). See also ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 1 (purpose of home-rule
provision is "to provide for maximum local self-government").
85. Early home-rule provisions were designed to overturn Dillon's Rule in favor of Cooley's
Doctrine of inherent sovereignty for local governments. Gere, Dillon's Rule and the Cooley Doc-
trine: Reflections of the Political Culture, 8 J. URB. HIsT. 271, 279-81 (1982). Some early propo-
nents advocated the imperium in imperio (a state within a state) form of home rule under which
local governments would exist in a dual sovereignty position with the states much as the states had
with the national government. See City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468
(1833). That theory largely has been rejected in current municipal corporation law. The term im-
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never come to pass,s" home rule clearly has expanded the authority of
cities to act without reference to specific state authorization. 1 It also
has increased judicial involvement in defining city governing powers by
forcing courts to interpret the exact scope of delegated authority under
vague home-rule grants s."
Additionally, inherent tribal authority is far from unlimited. As
noted above,"" there are federal common-law limits on tribal authority
in both the civil and the criminal arenas. Even when Congress has not
specifically eliminated a tribe's power to act, tribal authority is not au-
tomatic. Often courts must intervene to resolve tribal authority issues 0
Thus, even though traditional theory provides that tribes have in-
herent governing authority and cities do not, the power of city and tri-
bal governments to initiate legislation is often not that different. 1 In
perium in imperio is still used, but to refer to the form of home rule under which a defined scope
of authority is granted to the local government by the home-rule provision. See, e.g., D.
MANDFLKER ET AL., STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 110 (3d ed. 1990) [herein-
after STATE AND LoCAL GOVERNMENT]. This is not the meaning originally intended by early home-
rule proponents. A current example of true imperium in imperio may be the federally recognized
Indian tribes, who have inherent authority to act as a sovereign state within the United States.
86. Commentators generally agree that home-rule provisions have been interpreted more
narrowly than originally intended. See 0. REYNOLDS, supra, note 70, § 35, at 96; Williams, supra
note 1, at 121 n.200.
87. See Frug, supra note 1, at 1117. Different states have different types of home-rule provi-
sions. Some states limit them to cities containing a certain minimum population, see 0. REYNOLDS,
supra note 70, § 36, at 98, but the minimum population requirement is generally small (between
2000 and 10,000). Id. In many jurisdictions, home-rule authority is available for towns and villages,
and for any city regardless of size. See, e.g., MASS. CONsT. amend II, §§ 1-6 (as amended by MAss.
CONST. amend. LXXXIX) (cities and towns); PENN. CONST. art. 9, §§ 2, 3 & 14 ("municipalities");
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 13-101 (1981) (cities and towns with populations exceeding 2000 inhabitants).
See also J. FORDHAM, LocAL GOVERNMENT LAW 72 (rev. ed. 1975) (discussing the wide availability
of home-rule authority in certain states).
88. This has been particularly true for states adopting the imperium in imperio form of
home rule. STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 85, at 110-11. Indeed, some scholars criti-
cized this form of home rule precisely because it shifted more authority to the courts. Legislative
home rule, under which all possible authority is delegated to the cities subject to legislative retrac-
tion, was proposed as a means to reduce the role of the courts. Id. at 111. Courts continue, how-
ever, to play a major role in defining the scope of legislative preemption even under legislative
home-rule provisions. See, e.g., Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266 (Ill. 1984);
Cape Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 706 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1986); City of Albuquer-
que v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 605 P.2d 227 (N.M. 1980).
89. See supra note 27.
90. See Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990) (noting that federal common law limits tribal
criminal authority over nontribal Native Americans); National Farmers' Union Ins. Co. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (stating that federal common law may limit tribal judicial authority
over suits against non-Native Americans); United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (noting
that federal common law limits tribal civil authority over non-Native American activities on fee-
owned reservation lands).
91. When Dillon's Rule-concerning the source of local government authority-was first ar-
ticulated in the late 1800s, several scholars, principally Thomas Cooley and Eugene McQuillin,
challenged it on the ground that local governments historically had enjoyed an inherent and abso-
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the final analysis, the authority of both governments usually depends
not only on the unlimited dictates of the superior legislature, but also
on the judicial interpretation of the controlling law-for cities, the
home-rule provisions, for tribes, federal common law. Indeed, the power
of some cities under legislative home-rule provisions is almost identical
to that of tribes. Like tribes, legislative home-rule cities presumably
have the authority to act unless the legislature forbids it. 2 Yet, as they
do with tribes, courts still impose limitations on city regulations that
extend to matters not expressly placed off limits by the legislature.93
Since city and tribal governments are subject to both legislative
and judicial oversight, they depend in the long run more on outside
acceptance of their ideas than on some constitutional or inherent source
of authority to legitimize their actions. As noted in the previous sec-
tion,e4 their dependence on outside acceptance has allowed these local
nonconstitutional governments to hone their abilities to generate inter-
nal consensus and external approval.
B. Constituent Base
A second obvious difference between cities and tribes concerns the
demographic composition of their constituent bases. Members of a tri-
bal organization normally constitute a much more homogeneous group
than do residents of a city. Tribal membership generally is dependant
lute right to govern. See Frug, supra note 1, at 1113-14. See also People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut,
24 Mich. 44, 97-98, 108 (1871) (Cooley, J., concurring); 1 E. MCQuiLLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS, § 268, at 742-46 (2d ed. 1940). That view fell into disfavor in the twentieth century.
See Frug, supra note 1, at 1114-15.
92. See, e.g., Cape Motor Lodge, 706 S.W.2d at 210.
93. See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 605 P.2d 227, 232
(N.M. 1980). The Illinois home-rule provision expresses both the breadth of the grant and the
inherent limitation:
[A] home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its gov-
ernment and affairs ... [and] may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any
power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does
not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be
exclusive.
ILL. CoNST., art. VII, § 6, cis. (a), (i) (emphasis added).
The explanation provided by the drafters of the Illinois provision could apply equally to the
current authority of Indian tribes:
[The home rule clause] is designed to be the broadest possible description of the powers that
the receiving units of local government may exercise. It is clear, however, that the powers of
home rule units relate to their own problems, not to those of the state or nation. . . . Thus,
the proposed grant of powers to local governments extends only to matters "pertaining to
their government and affairs."
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1621 (1972), quoted in STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 85, at 134.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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on ancestry, 5 while cities attach no such qualification to citizenship. 6
The degree of homogeneity in a community affects the extent to which
each government can perform the role advocated in this Article.9 The
difference between tribes and cities with respect to homogeneity, how-
ever, is not as great as many people assume.
The modern composition of cities and tribes indicates increasingly
similar levels of homogeneity. Although the term "city" typically evokes
images of large cosmopolitan areas like New York or Los Angeles, most
American cities are not so large or diverse.98 More than seventy-five
percent of American cities have less than 5000 residents.9 Approxi-
mately one-half have less than 1000 residents. 100 Of the more than
19,000 cities in America, fewer than 500 have populations of 50,000 or
more.
101
Most cities are not only smaller than commonly imagined, they are
also more homogeneous. Many cities are composed primarily of people
of one race or economic class.10 2 Even residents of large metropolitan
areas typically live in smaller, more homogeneous suburbs outside the
diverse central city. 03 In short, the typical American city is more like
Morton Grove than Chicago.10 4
95. Although the blood quantum requirement for membership varies from tribe to tribe, all
federally recognized tribes have some blood quantum requirement. See C. SNIPP, AMERICAN INDI-
ANS: THE FIRST OF THIS LAND 361-65 (App. 4) (1989).
96. Indeed, a city could not impose such a requirement on citizenship without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding
that a city could not constitutionally prevent a grandmother and grandson from living together
within the city).
97. See infra note 166.
98. Many people assume that small, homogeneous communities no longer exist in America.
See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Forward: Traces of Self Government, 100
HARv. L. REv. 4, 22 n.96 (1986) (suggesting that "if the appeal of republican vision is restricted to
cases of small, homogeneous communities, it has little contemporary significance for American con-
stitutional law or theory").
99. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 8-9
(table 6) (1983) [hereinafter CENSUS OF GOVERNmENTS].
100. Id.; Briffault, Our Localism Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 348 (1990).
101. See CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, supra note 99, at 8 (table 6).
102. Briffault, supra note 100, at 348. See also J. HARRIGAN, POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE ME-
TROPOLIS 250-52 (4th ed. 1989) (classifying suburbs according to demographic distinctions such as
predominantly aflluent, middle-class, working-class, black, or elderly).
103. "In 1980, 45% of Americans lived in suburbs, 30% lived in central cities and 25% lived
in nonmetropolitan areas. In other words, 60% of the residents of metropolitan areas lived in sub-
urbs." Briffault, supra note 100, at 348 n.21 (citing U/S: A STATISTICAL PORTRAI OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 27 (A. Hacker ed., 1983)). See also id. at 348 n.22 (noting that "[t]he suburbs accounted
for 70% or more of the metropolitan population in the Detroit, Washington, D.C., Boston, St.
Louis, Pittsburgh, Atlanta and Miami areas").
104. Morton Grove is a suburb of Chicago, famous in legal circles for its successful efforts to
ban the possession of operable handguns. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th
[Vol. 44:12731294
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At the same time, many tribal organizations are composed of more
diverse groups than people commonly believe. Although most federally
recognized tribal organizations are composed of a single tribe, several
are not.1°5 For example, the Gila River Indian Community, the ninth
largest tribe in America, 10 6 and the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community, include members of both the Pima and Maricopa
Tribes. 10 7 Membership in the Colorado River Indian Tribes is extended
to both Mojave and Chemehuei Indians, as well as to some Hopi and
Navajo who located in the area after World War 11.108 The Wind River
Reservation is populated by both the Arapahoe and their historical ene-
mies, the Shoshone Indians. S09 The Yakima Indian Reservation is gov-
erned by a confederation of what were originally fourteen distinct
tribes.110 Moreover, even when official membership in a tribal organiza-
tion is limited to a single historic tribe, the presence of nontribal mem-
bers on the reservation significantly diversifies the tribal community.,"
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983); Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d
266 (M11. 984). In 1980 Morton Grove had a population of 23,747. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING 1980, Chicago, nl.-Census Tracts, P-5. Of these,
23,482 resided in households. Id. Over 90% of the families were married-couple families. Id. Sev-
enty-eight percent of the residents over age 25 were high school graduates. Id. at P-598. Nearly
60% of the households had an annual income between $20,000 and $50,000. Id. at P-1255 (25%
were below $20,000, and 15% above). The degree of homogeneity among the residents undoubtedly
made it easier to enact controversial legislation such as a handgun ban.
105. As one tribal court observed:
Indian tribes changed constantly in population makeup and in customs and traditions. This
process of change did not cease once Indian tribes were confined to reservations. In fact,
members of different tribes since then have been placed by governmental actions in situations
where they have met, socialized and lived with each other.
Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6008, 6009 (Intertr. Ct. App. 1984); see also F.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 6 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter F. COHEN, HANDBOOK '82] (not-
ing that "Congress has created 'consolidated' or 'confederated' tribes consisting of several ethno-
logical tribes, sometimes speaking different languages").
106. D. GETcHEs & C. WILKINSON, supra note 43, at 6.
107. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND INDIAN TRUST
AREAS 51, 70 (1974).
108. Id. at 43.
109. Id. at 603. Each tribe maintains a separate business council, but the business of the
reservation as a whole is carried out by a joint council. Id. at 604.
Other examples of multiethnic tribal organizations include the "Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of
Oklahoma, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (in which the Cherokees, Delawares, Shawnees, and
others were included), and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reserva-
tion." F. COHEN, HANDBOOK '82, supra note 105, at 6.
110. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
414 (1989).
111. Nationwide, Native Americans constitute less than 50% of the population on Indian
reservations. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEI'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICAN INDIAN AREAS AND ALASKA
NATIvE VILLAGES: 1980 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 16. On some reservations, including the largest, the
Navajo, the percentage of Native American residents is quite high. See, e.g., id. at 16-17 (Navajo,
95%; Hopi, 96%; Gila River, 96%). On others, the percentage is quite low. For example, of the
7873 residents of the Colorado River Indian Reservation in Arizona, only 1965 (25%) are Native
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This is not to imply that cities and tribes are equally homogeneous. The
vast majority of tribal communities are more homogeneous than even
the most homogeneous city. This fact justifies some differences in the
amount of deference granted to the two forms of government on some
matters.
112
Both cities and tribes, however, are clearly more homogeneous than
either the state or national communities. They both, therefore, are
more able to achieve internal consensus on some matters than are the
state and federal governments. Accordingly, while meaningful differ-
ences still exist, the shared attributes make it possible to envision a
common role for cities and tribes.
V. THE CURRENCY OF LOCAL NONCONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS:
PROPERLY INVESTING GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO YIELD
COMMUNITY AND PLURALISM
An understanding of the proper role of local governments in mod-
ern society requires some analysis of two dichotomies that have long
troubled American governments. The first involves the distinction be-
tween two different strains of democratic theory: group or tribal democ-
racy, which emphasizes community self-determination through majority
rule, and liberal democracy, which focuses on individual autonomy. 113
Although both strains of democracy emphasize self-determination, one
focuses on the group, and the other on the individual. Since the inter-
Americans. Id. at 16. See generally Miller v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6008, 6010
(Intertr. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the "reality is the residence on many Indian reservations of
nonmember Indians because of employment, intermarriage, foster care placements and
adoptions").
112. See infra note 166.
113. Gastil, What Kind of Democracy?, THE ATLANTic, June 1990, at 93. The same dichot.
omy is reflected in the debate between liberal and communitarian political theories. See, e.g., J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (arguing in support of deontological liberalism in which "jus-
tice" is the primary virtue); M. SANDEL, LmERALISM AND THE LiMrrs OF JusTICE (1982) (advancing a
communitarian critique of deontological liberalism).
The different emphases of these two viewpoints reflect a more fundamental disagreement con-
cerning the relationship between individuals and their society. Traditional liberals view individuals
as the "principal units of society." G. CLARK, supra note 58, at 24. Accordingly, for them "the local
state must ensure that community interests come second to individual freedom." Id. On the other
hand, for those advocating a structuralist view of government, "individuals have meaning as
human beings only to the extent of their relationships with the community" because "it is social
relations which define the individual, not a collection of individuals defining the community." Id.
at 28.
This disagreement, in turn, represents an even deeper disagreement concerning the constitu-
tion of the individual self. "Liberalism ... is founded on the idea of a presocial self, a solitary and
sometimes heroic individual confronting society . . . ." Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of
Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 6, 20 (1990). Communitarians, on the other hand, "believe in a radi-
cally socialized self that can never 'confront' society because it is, from the beginning, entangled in
society, itself the embodiment of social values." Id. at 20-21.
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ests of the group and the individual do not always coincide, there is
some tension between the two theories." 4 That tension can be helpful if
it creates a balance between the group and the individual.15 Lack of
balance, however, can undermine important interests.
Overemphasis of liberal democracy, or individual autonomy, can
lead to the destruction of community value systems, manifested as cul-
ture or learned and shared behavior patterns, since these systems de-
pend on something other than the individual preference."16 Shared
social norms exist prior to the entry of the individual into a society and
continue, perhaps in modified form, after the individual leaves. 17 Cul-
tural norms exist "over and above the individual. '" 8 If only individual
preference mattered, there would be no social norm, no shared values or
behavior. 119 At the extreme, no community values would exist, and an-
archy would result.12 0 On the other hand, overemphasis of tribal democ-
racy can lead to the suppression of critical individual rights. This has
been demonstrated by repressive' treatment of women by tribal de-
mocracies in such diverse places as Iran and the Santa Clara Pueblo in
114. The tension between communitarian and liberal political theories is "a consistently in-
termittent feature of liberal politics and social organization." Walzer, supra note 113, at 6. Other
scholars have noted a similar tension between the individualistic and communal aspects of
humans. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
205, 211-13 (1979); Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community-American Style, 79 Nw.
U1. REv. 900, 900 n.5 (1984-1985). Macneil attributes the tension to a conflict between selfishness
(the root of the individualistic aspect of humanness) and unselfishness (the root of the communal
aspect of humanness). Id. at 900 n.5.
115. See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belonging,
119 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (noting the "natural and usually desirable tension" between individual and
community interests); Walzer, supra note 113, at 14-16, 20-22 (arguing that classic liberalism re-
quires "periodic communitarian correction" but that communitarianism cannot be wholly substi-
tuted for classic liberalism).
116. See A. Ho BEL, THE LAW OF PRIMrrVE MAN 8 (1970).
117. Id. ("[T]he cultural patterns for behavior [meaning the learned behavior patterns mani-
fested and shared by the members of a society] exist prior to the entry of the individual into his
society. And when he has departed the patterns continue for those still living and those yet to
come.").
118. Id. (referring to culture as "superorganic").
119. See G. CLARK, supra note 58, at 32 (stating that "[a]n overwhelming emphasis on indi-
vidual choice strips liberal theory of any chance of integrating social values with individual ac-
tion"); L. FRiEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CuLTuRE 206 (1990)
(suggesting that "choice and expressive individualism tend to destroy tribal custom" (emphasis
omitted)); Gastil, supra note 113, at 96 (liberal democracy "has come upon the world rapidly, and
may ultimately be destructive of essential values").
120. Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden De-
terminants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1099 (1988).
121. The degree of repression, if any, varies for each tribal democracy. The indirect and lim-
ited gender discrimination of the Santa Clara Pueblo, see infra text accompanying notes 156-57, is
much less pervasive and repressive than that of a fundamentalist Islamic country like Iran, which
despite its lack of commitment to civil liberties can still be classified as a democracy, see Gastil,
supra note 113, at 94.
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New Mexico."'2
The second problematic dichotomy is the long-standing distinction
between public and private action.12 3 Courts have struggled for years to
determine what constitutes state, as opposed to private, action.124 The
struggle has been especially controversial when it has involved chal-
lenges to individual rights. Society recognizes the desirability of al-
lowing individuals to group together for various purposes and to define
those groups without interference from the government. 25 This group-
ing satisfies the human need to associate with others 12' and provides
individuals with increased influence in society by magnifying their
voices. 27
At the same time, however, history has shown that these groups
can wield power almost as great, if not as great, as the government it-
self, and that this power can be exercised in ways which are inimical to
the substantive values expressed in the Constitution. 2s Society some-
times may have, therefore, the conflicting interests of allowing private
associations to determine their own norms, while preventing the power-
less from being permanently excluded from advancement by those pri-
122. See Comment, supra note 120, at 1099 (extreme social conservatism "degenerates into
'mere moral conservatism,' preserving even manifest injustice and tyranny from change by
preventing normative criticism of traditional laws" (footnote omitted) (quoting H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY AND MORALrrY at 72 (1963)). See also Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dis-
locating the Community, 99 ETmIcS 275, 281 (1989) ("Besides excluding or suppressing outsiders,
the practices and traditions of numerous communities are exploitative and oppressive toward
many of their own members. This problem is of special relevance to women."); G. CLARK, supra
note 58, at 20-21 (describing the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People's
(NAACP) distrust of local governments).
123. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (recognizing the "essential
dichotomy" between public and private acts).
124. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
125. Such conduct is protected by the constitutional right of association. Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984).
126. The importance of group life recently has been reasserted in legal literature. See, e.g.,
Garet, supra note 57; Macneil, supra note 114; Gedicks, supra note 81. This aspect of association
is protected to some extent, and in some circumstances, by the constitutional right of intimate
association. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20.
127. This aspect of association receives some protection under the constitutional right of ex-
pressive association. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23. See also Worthen, supra note 66, at 1384-92
(arguing that the federal government's plenary power over Indian tribes should be limited by the
right of expressive association).
128. For example, in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Supreme Court held that
exclusion of blacks from the pre-primary elections of the Jaybird Democratic Association, a volun-
tary club of white Democrats, violated the Fifteenth Amendment because candidates who won the
Jaybird election typically ran unopposed in the Democratic primaries. Id. at 463; see also Soifer,
Freedom of Association: Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 MD. L. REv. 350, 353-
54 (1989) (stating that "[m]any of us maintain healthy fears of decisions made by unaccountable
power elites who gather at exclusive watering-holes, of the grip of cults over the will of individuals,
of the spectre of mob violence, and of the baleful influence of economic power consolidated in
lobbying and election spending").
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vate groups.129 Like the tribal/liberal democratic theory dichotomy, this
strain on the public/private dichotomy rests, to some extent, on the
tension between group and individual rights.
Local nonconstitutional governments can be essential in properly
balancing this tension. City and tribal governments are less threatening
to individual liberties than the state or federal governments because
they are subject to the overriding authority of the superior sovereigns,
which have the right to enforce fundamental individual rights, 30 and
because they are more voluntary than their federal and state counter-
parts. Additionally, because local governments are smaller and more ho-
mogeneous than their constitutional counterparts, they can more easily
construct value systems agreeable to individual members, and they can
do so without affecting as many people who hold different values. Their
control over a limited geographic area facilitates the development of
community value systems and provides increased motivation for mem-
ber participation, both of which legitimize the value choices made.
Formal government institutions that facilitate the creation and
preservation of value systems without unduly infringing on individual
rights are beneficial in modern society for two reasons. First, unlike
purely private associations, local governments constitute a permanent
form of community. They provide everyone, even those who do not
have opportunities to participate in more intimate forms of communi-
ties such as religion or family, with a chance to experience the benefits
that accompany community membership.
This communal role of local governments has been recognized com-
monly with respect to cities. Cities have generated support for their au-
tonomy by emphasizing the desirability of local control over
decisionmaking and of allowing people to determine for themselves how
they will be governed. 13' Cities often defend their autonomy on the ba-
sis that they provide an outlet for the political aspect of humanness,3 2
129. The law usually attempts to solve the dilemma by ascertaining what is public or state
activity and then imposing great limitations on that activity. Activity which is determined to be
private is, by and large, not regulated at all. See infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text. As
Kathleen Sullivan has pointed out, acts of private voluntary groups are not only unfettered by the
Constitution, they are often "protected in the name of liberty." Sullivan, supra note 81, at 1715.
130. A proper balance of tribal and liberal democracy requires that the superior sovereign be
empowered to enforce those civil rights which represent the national or state norm on essential
matters. This may require that the superior sovereign open its courts to resolve challenges to the
local government's compliance with civil rights laws. See Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old
Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REv. 65, 99-111 (1990).
131. The right of local control over value choices often has been linked directly to the availa-
bility of widespread citizen participation in the decisionmaking process. Gelfand, supra note 37, at
783.
132. See Aristotle, Politics, in NINE GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 446 (1952) (stat-
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an aspect that is often overlooked in a traditional liberal society that
focuses solely on individual rights.133 Cities, in the form of towns, have
long been identified as the governmental entities that most meaning-
fully can allow people to satisfy their innate need to associate with one
another and, to a limited degree, subordinate their individual desires to
that of the group.13  From the time of De Tocqueville 3 5 to the pre-
sent, 3 6 political commentators have noted the responsiveness of cities
to this human desire to belong to, and participate in, a meaningful
group endeavor. Despite relatively less exposition, the same can be said
for Indian tribes.
The second reason formal government institutions that facilitate
the creation and preservation of limited value systems are important is
that they contribute to the development of pluralism and tolerance by
providing meaningful voice to community members and to the values
they share-values which might otherwise be ignored. When those who
share Native American values band together, for example, it is harder
to ignore them. While it may be simple to disregard a single Native
American who advocates preservation of native lands, it is much more
difficult to ignore the wishes of an entire tribe, especially when the is-
sues involved arise on that tribe's reservation. 37 Moreover, people who
live in the same geographic area can better perpetuate their value sys-
tem. Inculcation of values from one generation to the next is essential
to the preservation of the differences that contribute to modern plural-
ing that "man is by nature a political animal"). See also M. SANDEL, supra note 113, at 179 (argu-
ing that there can be no conception of self without taking into account allegiances and
commitments to others).
133. See M. SANDEL, supra note 113, at 179-83 (attacking liberal account of self for failure to
recognize the constitutive nature of commercial bonds); Macneil, supra note 114, at 934-37 (draw-
ing contrast between a community-based vision of society and the traditional "man-the-atom"
view prevalent in most traditional liberal thought).
134. On the innate human desire to join in communities with others, see Garet, supra note
57, at 1070-71; Macneil, supra note 114, at 934-35.
135. [T]he township serves as a centre for the desire of public esteem, the want of exciting
interests, and the taste for authority and popularity, in the midst of the ordinary relations of
life; and the passions which commonly embroil society, change their character when they find
a vent so near the domestic hearth and the family circle.
1 A. DR TOCqUEVILLE, supra note 72, at 62-63.
136. Frug, supra note 1, at 1068-72.
137. As De Tocqueville observed, societies formed for expressive purposes "possess more au-
thority than the press. When an opinion is represented by a society, it necessarily assumes a more
exact and explicit form." 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 72, at 217. But see 7 R. EMERSON, THE
JOURNALS AND MISCELLANEOUS NOTEBOOKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 437-38 (A.W. Plumstead &
H. Hayford eds., 1969) (positing that "[c]oncert, men think, is more powerful than isolated effort
& think to prove it arithmetically with slate & pencil: but concert is neither better nor worse[,]
neither more nor less potent than individual force" (alteration in original)), quoted in Soifer, "To-
ward a Generalized Notion of the Right to Form or Join an Association": An Essay for Tom
Emerson, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 641, 651 (1988).
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ism. 3 " This transgenerational value sharing is facilitated by the geo-
graphic proximity that local nonconstitutional governments provide.13 9
Exposure to different value systems not only makes mainstream so-
ciety more tolerant of the views of others, it also causes a reexamination
of more established value systems. ° Communities with unorthodox
values, as compared to the national society, also provide a laboratory
for testing the desirability of those values.' 4 ' This contributes to the
development of a society in which not only is pluralism valued, but the
benefits of pluralism-greater respect for others, greater awareness of
the meaning of one's own values, and refinement of overall value sys-
tems from comparison with others-are realized.
Tribes have emphasized the benefits of pluralism generated by per-
manent structured communities, attempting, with mixed success, to
convince society of the desirability of allowing others to make some
value choices that are different from the perceived national or state
norm." 2 Of course, people have long recognized the pluralism contribu-
tions that the continued existence of tribes makes to society. Given the
similarities between tribes and cities, people should recognize the po-
tential of cities to make similar contributions.143
VI. COMMUNITY AND PLURALISM: DIVIDENDS OF LOCAL DECISIONMAKING
AND AUTONOMY
Problems involving the authority of local governments generally
can be divided into two broad categories: First, those concerning the
138. See Worthen, supra note 66, at 1386 & n.66.
139. Id. at 1388-89.
140. As Judith Resnik has observed, "[W]hat the federal government is prepared to tolerate
in 'them' [tribes] depends upon how it defines itself. . . ." Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHL L. REv. 671, 755 (1989). By requiring the larger
society to decide the degree to which different value choices will be respected, diverse communities
force the larger society to examine its own values and prejudices. Id. at 757 (suggesting that "[t]he
degree of toleration of the 'other' sovereign's decisions enables the federal government to make
plain what its own values are").
141. The description of "governmental laboratories" has long been applied to states. See
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). It more re-
cently has been applied to Indian tribes. See Resnik, supra note 140, at 757.
142. The pluralism argument seems better fit for Indian tribes than cities because the differ-
ences between tribal values and the national norm are generally more apparent than between city
values and the state norm. That the tribal government's viability may rest more on pluralism than
on the popular appeal of local control suggests something about the relative importance of the two
factors. Popular support for tribal governments has experienced more dramatic peaks and valleys
than has popular support for other local governments throughout American history. This may indi-
cate that in America concern for local control is more consistent than concern for tolerance and
diversity.
143. Some commentators recently have claimed that local governments do give more voice to
minorities and women. See, e.g., Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1988).
1991] 1301
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
local government's power vis-A-vis an individual citizen, and second,
those concerning the local government's power vis-A-vis the superior
sovereign.'" Examples from experiences of tribes and cities illustrate
how recognition of their roles as facilitators of community and plural-
ism can lead to a new approach for resolving conflicts in both
categories.
A. Local Governments and Individual Rights: A Lesson from the
Tribes
This Article's suggested approach for resolving disputes between
local government authority and individual rights is based on the experi-
ence of Indian tribes under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 45 The
ICRA statutorily imposes on tribal governments many, but not all, of
the restrictions placed on the federal and state governments by the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 6 Many federal and tribal
courts, 4  however, have refused to apply blindly the concepts devel-
oped in the state and federal context to cases involving challenges to
tribal authority, recognizing the difference between tribal governments
and their federal and state counterparts. 148
As an example of this application, in Crowe v. Eastern Band of
144. Many judicial disputes involve situations which fall into both categories. For example,
an individual may challenge local government action affecting individual rights on the ground that
it is prohibited by the law of the superior sovereign. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49 (1978). In such cases, the court should consider both aspects of the problem.
145. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988).
146. Several provisions of the ICRA restate the essence of their constitutional counterparts
with minor (although, not always insignificant) differences in wording. Compare 25 U.S.C. §
1302(8) (1988) ("No Indian tribe... shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.")
with U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Njor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."). Other differences are more obvious. For example, the ICRA contains no
prohibition against tribal establishment of a religion, nor any right to vote in tribal elections, and
the right to counsel in a criminal trial is limited by the defendant's ability to pay for the assistance
himself. Moreover, "[the provisions of the Second and Third Amendments, in addition to those of
the Seventh Amendment, were omitted entirely." Martinez, 436 U.S. at 63 n.14.
147. From 1968 to 1978 federal courts were the primary enforcers of the ICRA. In 1979 the
Supreme Court ruled that, except for habeas corpus actions, federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
actions involving the ICRA. See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58-59. Since 1979 tribal courts have been
the primary enforcers of the statute. See Worthen, supra note 130, at 95-97, 115.
148. In some ICRA cases, courts have applied standards developed in cases involving the
federal and state governments. See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White
Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz.
1969). This usually occurred when the tribes themselves had adopted laws that paralleled federal
laws. See, e.g., Daly, 483 F.2d at 704-05; White Eagle, 478 F.2d at 1314; Howlett v. Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, 529 F.2d 233, 237-39 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Worthen, supra note 130, at 113
n.215.
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Cherokee Indians, Inc. 49 the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court
erred in applying common-law property principles to a property dispute
between the tribe and an individual member because the common law
was not consistent with tribal traditions and customs. The court agreed
with the trial court's conclusion that the tribe could not, without pro-
viding notice and a hearing, deprive the plaintiff of tribal land given to
her by prior agreement with other heirs to the land. The court nonethe-
less reversed the trial court's order that the tribe restore to the plaintiff
her possession under the agreement. The court reasoned that restoring
possession to the plaintiff unduly would interfere with the tribe's ability
to perpetuate the traditional concept of communal use of tribal land.150
A similar approach was used by the tribal court in Squaxin Island
Tribe v. Johns.'5 The criminal defendant in Squaxin Island asserted
that his due process rights were violated when the court concluded that
he waived his right to a jury trial 52 by failing to appear without justifi-
cation on two occasions. The court rejected the defendant's argument,
reasoning that the ICRA due process provision was more flexible than
its constitutional counterpart because, unlike the constitutional provi-
sion, "due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act is intended to
serve a dual purpose-affording protection to individuals while, at the
same time, protecting tribal governmental authority."'' 5 Other courts
also have justified deviations from the constitutional norm by empha-
sizing a tribe's interest in maintaining its cultural identity. 5 4
The use of this more flexible approach does not require courts to
abdicate their role as enforcers of individual rights. Indeed, many
courts applying this approach have struck down tribal legislation that
interfered with individual rights, but only after considering not only the
routine individual and governmental interests implicated in cases in-
volving the state and federal governments, but also the need to permit
tribes to maintain group cohesiveness and a separate way of life.155
A prime example of this flexible approach is the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo.'56 Julia Martinez, a mem-
149. 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974).
150. Id. at 1236.
151. 15 Indian L. Rep. 6010 (Sq. I. Tr. Ct. 1987).
152. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1988) prohibits a tribe from "deny[ing] to any person accused of
an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than
six persons."
153. Squaxin Island, 15 Indian L. Rep. at 6011.
154. See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1973) (upholding blood
quantum requirement for tribal officers because of tribe's "cultural interest"); Yellow Bird v.
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974) (upholding tribal membership standards).
155. See, e.g., Daly, 483 F.2d at 705-06; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 540 F.2d 1039 (10th
Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
156. 540 F.2d 1039 (10th Cir. 1976), reu'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). As a result of
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ber of the Santa Clara Pueblo, challenged a tribal ordinance denying
tribal membership to her children because their father was not a tribal
member. She alleged that the ordinance violated the equal protection
provision of the ICRA because tribal membership was extended to chil-
dren whose fathers were tribal members even though their mothers
were not, discrimination clearly based on the gender of the tribal mem-
ber. The Tenth Circuit held that the ordinance violated the ICRA, but
only after giving "due consideration" to the tribe's interest in "main-
taining its integrity and in retaining its tribal cultures. ' 157 In short, the
court placed an additional weight on the government side of the bal-
ance, recognizing that the tribe had an interest in preserving a sense of
community identity, which in turn contributed to group pluralism.
That weight was insufficient to overcome the particular instance of dis-
crimination described in the suit,158 but it did mandate extra scrutiny.
In cases involving challenges to tribal authority over individuals,
therefore, courts applying the ICRA have applied a modified version of
the substantive guarantees traditionally granted to individuals. Courts
have recognized the differences between the roles of tribal governments,
on the one hand, and federal and state governments on the other. By
explicitly recognizing that local nonconstitutional governments play a
unique role in developing a sense of community and pluralism, courts
resolving challenges to local government authority over individuals
might profitably take the same approach in other contexts.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's struggle to delineate
the extent of a government's authority to ban nude dancing. In 1981 the
Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.159 Ten years later in
the Supreme Court's ruling in Martinez, nonhabeas corpus ICRA actions must now be tried exclu-
sively in tribal court (again, excepting habeas corpus actions). See Worthen, supra note 130, at 87-
92. The constitutionality and wisdom of that limitation is highly questionable. Federal court super-
vision probably is necessary if ICRA rights are to be enforced meaningfully. Id. at 99-103. That the
courts of the superior sovereign should be involved in the enforcement process does not mean,
however, that those courts should apply standards applicable to the federal and state governments
without considering the additional interests involved when a local government's actions are
challenged.
- 157. Martinez, 540 F.2d at 1046.
158. The Tenth Circuit found it significant that the Martinez children were reared at the
Pueblo, spoke the Tewa language of the tribe, practiced the customs of the tribe, and were ac-
cepted into the tribe's religion. Id. at 1041, 1047. The court also was influenced by the fact that the
tribal ordinance was enacted only in 1939, largely as a matter of "economics and pragmatism."
Prior to that time the children of some Santa Clara women and nontribal men were admitted into
the tribe. Id. at 1047.
159. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). Although the ordinance at issue in Schad prohibited all live en-
tertainment, the challenge was brought by a bookstore featuring nude dancers, id. at 62-63, and
the Court's opinion focused in part on the town's authority to ban nude dancing. Id. at 66. Indeed,
the citation to Schad in the Court's most recent decision on the issue states solely that "nude
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,160 the Court upheld a state statute ban-
ning nude dancing without overruling Schad. Application of the ap-
proach suggested above would cause the Court to reach just the
opposite result. Local governments should be freer than states to regu-
late such activities because the weight used in the balancing process
when larger, more heterogeneous governments are involved does not in-
clude the interests of community and group pluralism.
In essence, this Article's suggested approach would follow Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Schad. The Schad majority ignored the vil-
lage's interest in developing its own community norms, choosing to fo-
cus instead on the impact nude dancing had on other municipal
interests." 1 The dissent, on the other hand, emphasized the rights of
local "[c]itizens . . .to choose to shape their community so that it em-
bodies their conception of the 'decent life,' "1162 explicitly recognizing
the local government's interest in developing a sense of community, an
interest ignored by the majority opinion. The plurality in Barnes erred
by going too far in the opposite direction. While correctly recognizing
that a government's interest in advancing moral norms may be relevant
in some cases,163 the plurality completely failed to evaluate how strong
that interest could be at a state level. While a small village, such as
Mount Ephraim, could assert convincingly that a ban on nude dancing
would "preserve the basic character of [the] community"'' 4 and main-
tain the moral atmosphere necessary to preserve that character, such a
showing would be much more difficult for a state.6 5 Accordingly, a local
government's interest in regulating such matters may justify some inci-
dental infringement on individual rights under circumstances in which
a state's interest would not.
This does not mean that local governments always will win when
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation." Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991) (quoting Schad, 452 U.S. at 66).
160. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
161. Schad, 452 U.S. at 72-74.
162. Id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
163. The plurality concluded that the state's interest in "protecting order and morality" was
"substantial." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462. The other two Justices in the majority were unwilling to
go so far. Id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring) (concluding that "moral opposition to nudity supplies
a rational basis for its prohibition") (emphasis added); id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring) (refus-
ing to "rest my concurrence ... on the possible sufficiency of society's moral views to justify the
limitations at issue").
164. Id. at 86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
165. Justice Stevens indicated his willingness to uphold the ban on live entertainment in
Schad if the village had produced sufficient evidence that it was a "small residential community
[seeking] to exclude the commercial exploitation of nude dancing from a 'setting of tranquility.'"
Id. at 79 (Stevens, J., concurring). The problem he noted was that the "'basic character of [the]
community' [was] not at all clear on the basis of the ... record." Id. at 83 n.9. A small local
government could more easily show "character" than a larger state.
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there is a conflict between community values and individual rights, or
that they will win substantially more cases than under the current ap-
proach, in which courts treat local and state governments identically. It
means only that courts consciously would consider a local government's
unique role in the balancing process, with the possibility that in some
close cases that extra consideration may be determinative.1 6
This approach to the protection of individual rights may appear
completely radical. It is not. Current constitutional law uses an all-or-
nothing approach in resolving disputes between government and indi-
viduals. If the action is classified as state action, courts weigh the stan-
dard individual and governmental interests regardless of the type of
government involved. 167 On the other hand, if the action is classified as
private action, no limitation is imposed; the individual loses.68 Thus,
courts have focused almost exclusively on the state action component of
the formula, as evidenced by cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer 9 Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,7 0  Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.,' 7' and Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks. 2 Several commenta-
tors have observed that the line between state and private action has
become hopelessly confused, as courts have altered results on the basis
of the type of individual right and prevalence of the problem in-
volved.17 3 Courts, therefore, already are applying a test in which the
166. The significance of the community interest will vary depending on the exact makeup of
the local government. Courts typically should allow more leeway to tribal governments than city
governments because tribes generally are more homogeneous, and therefore, more able to promote
a sense of community and group diversity. For the same reason, courts should give greater defer-
ence to smaller cities than to larger ones. Classification of cities on the basis of population is fairly
common. See, e.g., UTAH CoDE ANN. § 10-2-301 (1987) (providing for classification of cities as fol-
lows: Class 1, 100,000 or more; Class 2, 60,000-100,000; Class 3, 800-60,000; Town, 0-800). Gener-
ally, larger cities are given more power. The approach advocated by this Article would reverse that
trend on certain matters.
167. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969); Colin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
168. Flagg Bros,, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974).
169. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (involvement of the state court in enforcing a racially restrictive cove-
nant in an agreement between private parties constitutes state action).
170. 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (actions of a private restaurant that leased its premises from a state
agency constitute state action).
171. 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (acts of a public utility operating under a state-granted monopoly
do not constitute state action).
172. 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (acts of a private warehouseman authorized by state statute do not
constitute state action).
173. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1315-22 (1982) (positing that whether mere existence of state
property laws constitutes state action depends on nature of right asserted); Friendly, The Public-
Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1982) (arguing that "the
result in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. would have been different if the company had re-
fused to serve blacks").
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outcome varies depending on the nature of the right involved. The ap-
proach suggested here merely would authorize the same consideration
for the nature of the governmental interest in appropriate situations." 4
Courts already give varying weight to governmental interests de-
pending on the type of community involved in obscenity cases. They
grant a homogeneous community more leeway in defining obscenity
than a heterogeneous one."" Although the cases have not expressly rec-
ognized the distinction, it clearly exists. A forthright admission of its
importance would not radically alter the law.
Some scholars may contend that the approach outlined above
would result in the destruction of individual liberties at the hands of
local governments. This doomsday scenario seems extremely unlikely
for several reasons. First, cities and tribes remain subject to the dictates
of the superior sovereign. If the legislature of the superior sovereign
clearly commands that individual rights prevail, those rights will pre-
vail.171 Extreme abuses thus would be discouraged by the political pro-
cess of the superior sovereign.17 7 Second, most fundamental individual
rights rarely, if ever, would be outweighed by consideration of commu-
nity and pluralism interests. 78 Finally, increased existence of diverse
communities may contribute to increased tolerance, making all mem-
bers of society more solicitous of the right of others to be different.
In sum, the experience of Indian tribes under the ICRA provides
174. Other scholars have suggested that some constitutional limitations should apply differ-
ently to cities than to the state or federal governments. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1558-
63 (noting that local elections need not be conducted on a one resident, one vote basis even though
that requirement is constitutionally mandated for federal and state elections).
175. The Supreme Court has recognized that the exact contours of the First Amendment
vary from community to community. "There is no constitutional barrier... to prohibiting com-
munications that are obscene in some communities under local standards even though they are not
obscene in others." Sable Communication of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989).
176. Courts that defer to tribal customs in ICRA cases usually do so because they determine
that Congress authorized that approach. See, e.g., Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 681-82 (10th
Cir. 1971); Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974). Presumably a
clear legislative command to the contrary would result in a less deferential approach.
177. Justice Powell recognized this political check in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 373 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring), in which he argued that the Court should allow local governments more
room to experiment with political structures because state legislatures "elected under the rule of
one person, one vote will be vigilant to prevent undue concentration of power in the hands of
undemocratic bodies." Id.
178. Classifications based on race or religion, for example, are hard to justify on any grounds
and should not be tolerated. Although some tribal legislation discriminating on racial grounds has
been upheld, see Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1973) (blood quantum re-
quirement for some tribal officers upheld), the community and group pluralism interests would not
be strong enough in any non-Native American community to justify such distinctions. Cf. Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (stating that the government's "fundamen-
tal, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education ... substantially out-
weighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on [the] exercise of ... religious beliefs").
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the background for a reformulation of the method for resolving disputes
between local governments and individuals. Court should explicitly rec-
ognize and consider the unique role of local nonconstitutional govern-
ments in our society.
B. Local Governments and the Superior Sovereign: A Lesson from
the Cities
The suggested approach for resolving disputes between local gov-
ernmental authority and that of the superior sovereign is based on the
experience of cities with respect to zoning matters. Cities have long had
great discretion over zoning matters, notwithstanding the limitations on
local governmental authority required by Dillon's Rule.179 Although the
amount of deference courts grant to local governments in this area has
lessened in some jurisdictions, a majority of courts' s° still use an ap-
proach that suggests a method by which courts can consider the local
government's community interest when resolving disputes with the su-
perior sovereign.
In determining the limits on a city's zoning authority, most courts
focus on the extent to which the particular ordinance at issue achieves
the city's purposes in passing that ordinance. What is most important
for present purposes is that courts often expressly recognize that build-
ing a sense of community among the city's residents is a legitimate goal
of zoning ordinances."" Courts that have recognized this community in-
terest perhaps unwittingly have shifted their focus from the needs of
some abstract political entity to the needs of a group of individuals liv-
ing together-a shift from sovereignty to community. This change of
focus, though subtle, can be important in resolving disputes between
179. See, e.g., Simon v. Town of Needham, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Mass. 1942) (zoning law
upheld because not unreasonable); Clary v. Borough of Eatontown, 124 A.2d 54, 66 (N.J. 1956)
(courts should "allow fullest flexibility to the range of well-informed local judgment as to the pre-
cise way in which local zoning can best serve the welfare of the particular community"); Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Wayne TP, 89 A.2d 693, 696 (N.J. 1952) (zoning statutes should be construed "liber-
ally in favor of the municipalities").
180. The extreme deference approach used in the New Jersey cases cited supra note 179 has
been altered dramatically by the New Jersey Supreme Court beginning with Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975), and Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983). Similar revisions were made by courts in New York, Pennsylvania, and California. See
Briffault, supra note 6, at 41-57. However, "[tihe vast majority of state courts have left local land
use authority untouched." Id. at 42. For purposes of this portion of the Article, it is not so impor-
tant what the law now is, as what it could be if courts adopted the proposed approach.
181. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) ("The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.").
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local governments and their superior sovereigns.
When a court couches a dispute between a city and a state or be-
tween a tribe and the federal government in terms of sovereignty, the
result generally is foreordained because the federal and state govern-
ments are the superior sovereigns. If sovereignty is the only weight a
court considers, the superior sovereign, by definition, will prevail. On
the other hand, if courts recognize that there is also an important inter-
est in community when a dispute between the two sovereigns arises, the
outcome occasionally may favor the local governments because they are
better able to achieve that community interest than are the larger, more
heterogeneous superior sovereigns. The community interest will not al-
ways prevail. Indeed, in many disputes it may not come into play at all.
If courts expressly recognize the community interest, however, the local
governments more often will prevail.
An example of how this subtle shift in focus might alter the out-
come of a dispute between a local government and the superior sover-
eign is the question of the inherent zoning authority of Indian tribes. In
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Na-
tion'82 the Supreme Court upheld the tribe's 83 authority to zone fee
lands owned by non-Native Americans within one portion of the reser-
vation, while striking down that authority in another portion of the res-
ervation."" The Court split three ways with respect to the proper
approach to the problem. 85
Justice White, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, began from the premise that tribes lack any author-
ity over the activities of non-Native Americans.186 Justice White then
concluded that an exception to that general rule-one which permitted
tribal regulation of conduct threatening the political integrity, economic
182. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
183. Although the tribe is composed of 14 originally distinct Indian tribes, they banded to-
gether and now are treated as one legal entity. Id. at 414.
184. The Court upheld the tribe's right to zone fee land in the "closed" part of its reserva-
tion, but not in the "open" portion. The tribe made the division between the two areas in order to
maintain the closed area's grazing, forest, and wildlife resources. Id. at 438 (Opinion of Stevens,
J.). The critical distinctions between the two areas were the following: (1) access to the closed area
had been limited to members of the tribe and their permittees, id. at 422 (Opinion of White, J.);
(2) the closed area was less developed than the open area, id. at 438 (Opinion of Stevens, J.); (3) a
much greater percentage of the land in the open area was non-Native American owned fee land, id.
at 440; and (4) 80% of the open area residents were not tribal members. Id. at 445.
185. Only Justices Stevens and O'Connor supported the overall ruling. Justices White,
Scalia, and Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a narrower view of tribal zoning au-
thority. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall adopted a more expansive view.
186. Id. at 428 (Opinion of White, J.) (stating that "under the general principle enunciated
in Montana [v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)], the Yakima Nation has no authority to impose
its zoning ordinance on the fee lands owned by petitioners . . ").
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security, or health and welfare of the tribe-did not apply. He deter-
mined that development of the open area, contrary to the wishes of the
tribe, did not interfere with any interest of the Yakima Nation8 1 and
that further proceedings were required before definitive findings could
be made on that issue with respect to the closed area.8 "
Justice White's approach clearly focused on the tribe as a political
entity, rather than a community. According to his view, a tribe can reg-
ulate the activity of non-Native Americans on fee-owned land only
when lack of tribal authority would create a "demonstrably serious" im-
pact on the tribe as a governmental entity.8 9 Justice White's conclu-
sion that a lack of zoning authority in the open area did not "imperil
any interest" of the tribe underscores the fact that he did not even
consider community interests. 190 He approached it as a question of sov-
ereign power, in which the tribe's "dependent status" was
determinative.' 9"
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O'Connor, used an approach
that, at first glance, appears to focus on the tribe's community interest.
Justice Stevens recognized that zoning power enables a community to
define its essential character and that the tribe had an interest in "pro-
tecting the tribal community.' ' 92 His approach ultimately rested, how-
ever, not on a balance of the interests of the governments involved,
including the tribe's community interest, but rather on the sovereign
power of the tribe to exclude nonmembers from the reservation, power
which Congress as the superior sovereign could remove at any time. 9 3
He suggested that Congress had not divested the tribe of authority to
zone areas in which the vast majority of the land was held in trust for
the tribe (the closed area), but that it must have intended to remove
that authority over the open area, which no longer was undeveloped or
populated mostly by tribal members.' Thus, while acknowledging the
187. Id. at 431 (Opinion of White, J.).
188. Id. at 432. Justice White stated that the zoning procedures initiated by the county with
respect to the land should be allowed to conclude before any determination is made as to whether
tribal interests were adequately protected.
189. Id. at 431.
190. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 425-26.
192. Id. at 433 (Opinion of Stevens, J.).
193. Justice Stevens stated that "the proper resolution of these cases depends on the extent
to which the Tribe's virtually absolute power to exclude has been either diminished by federal
statute or voluntarily surrendered by the Tribe itself." Id.
194. Justice Stevens explained:
Although it is inconceivable that Congress would have intended that the sale of a few lots
would divest the Tribe of the power to determine the character of the tribal community, it is
equally improbable that Congress envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regu-
lating the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice in setting
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tribe's interest in developing a sense of community through the use of
the zoning power, Justice Stevens ultimately focused on the extent to
which the federal government's sovereign power overcame the tribe's
sovereign powers.1 95 This shift in focus from community to sovereignty
was significant because congressional intent on the matter was far from
clear. 198
Justice Blackmun's approach, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, focused more on community than did either of the other two
opinions. While Justice White concluded that the lack of zoning author-
ity had no impact on any tribal interest in this case, Justice Blackmun
found it "difficult to conceive of a power more central to 'the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe' . . . than the power to
zone." 19 7 Although the two opinions used the same words, clearly they
were considering different things. Justice White's approach focused
more on the threat to the tribe as an abstract legal entity,9 s while Jus-
tice Blackmun's opinion concentrated more on the threat to the tribe as
a community. That difference in focus led to a different outcome under
the facts of the case.
Had the Brendale Court focused more on community and less on
sovereignty, the result would have been more favorable to the tribe.
That same change in emphasis might alter the outcome in other dis-
putes between local governments and their superior sovereign""9 and
could be applied usefully on behalf of tribes and cities in certain
situations.
tribal policy.
Id. at 437. See also id. at 447 (suggesting that "it is unlikely that Congress intended to give the
Tribe the power to determine the character of an area that is predominantly owned and populated
by nonmembers, who represent 80 percent of the population yet lack a voice in tribal
governance").
195. Justice Stevens also noted that the demographic change in the open area, a key factor in
his decision, resulted from congressional legislation in the late nineteenth century opening reserva-
tion lands to settlement by non-Native Americans. Id. at 436.
196. Justice Stevens concluded only that it was improbable and unlikely that congressional
intent was to the contrary. Id. at 437, 447. He did not cite any statutory language or legislative
history to support these conclusions.
197. Id. at 458 (Opinion of Blackmun, J.).
198. Justice Blackmun observed that Justice White's opinion "replaces sovereignty with a
form of legal tokenism." Id. at 462.
199. As Justice Blackmun observed, a finding of inherent zoning authority does not necessa-
rily entail "a finding of inherent authority for all police powers." Id. at 461. The community focus
has a particularly significant impact in zoning cases because, as Justice Stevens noted, "[z]oning is
the process whereby a community defines its essential character." Id. at 433 (Opinion of Stevens,
J.).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The study of American governments in most law schools focuses
mainly, if not exclusively, on the federal and state governments. Conse-
quently, most lawyers and courts treat cities and tribes as mere ap-
pendages, whose sole purpose is to carry out the directions of their
superior sovereign. These two nonconstitutional governments, however,
can provide a focal point for resolving some of the thorny problems that
currently plague our democratic form of government. Large, centralized
governments are incapable of reversing the modern tendency to deify
individual rights at the expense of community interests on which our
republic rests. 00 Cities and tribes, however, can perform the unique role
of permanent communities in which people can create, preserve, and
give meaningful -voice to disparate value systems, without requiring all
to sacrifice their individual freedoms to a single viewpoint.0 1 By em-
phasizing their common ability to carry out this desirable function, cit-
ies and tribes can, despite their differences, become the currency with
which modern society satisfies its obligation to both community and
pluralist interests.
200. See Sandel, supra note 55, at 93-94.
201. Michael Wazer has noted that empowerment of local governments would balance com-
munitarian and liberalism interests. Such empowerment would be "a pursuit of the intimations of
community within liberalism, for it has more to do with John Stuart Mill than with Rousseau.
Now we are to imagine the nonneutral state empowering cities, towns, and boroughs; fostering
neighborhood committees and review boards .... " Walzr, supra note 113, at 20.
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